Compliance: card data, recordings and audit
The controls a bank's, hospital's or university's auditors ask about, how each one works, and what it does not cover. Admins see the state of every control under Organization settings → Compliance.
- Card entry
- Keypad, never heard or recorded
- Recordings
- AES-256-GCM + SHA-256 each
- Audit trail
- Hash-chained, append-only
- Transport
- TLS 1.2 / 1.3, SRTP
Card numbers and PINs on the keypad (secure capture)
During a call, the agent presses Secure card entry and chooses what to collect (card number, CVV, PIN, OTP, CNIC). The customer types it on their keypad. Until they finish:
- the customer's keypad tones and voice are blocked towards the agent (rtpengine, on the agent's side of the call);
- the call recording pauses;
- the agent sees only progress (
•••• ••__ ____ ____), then the last four digits and whether a card number passes its check digit; - the digits are kept in memory by the voip-redactor service, sent once to your system (Self-service API, signed with HMAC), then wiped. They are never written to disk or logged.
Keypad tones never reach agents (keypad guard)
Without any button: on every answered call to a person, the other party's keypad tones are blocked towards that person and only counted. When someone types 4 or more digits within 6 seconds, their voice is muted for the agent as well, until 3 seconds after the last key, so nothing typed or read out alongside reaches the agent.
- Tones sent as sound (old phones, some carriers) are recognised by the phone system and treated the same way.
- The guard protects the agent's ear. The recording still holds the caller's voice during a burst of digits; use secure capture when card data is expected.
- Switch it off for the whole installation with
KEYPAD_GUARD="no"inconfig.env.
Masking from your IVR or PBX: X-PCI-Mask
A system in the call path (a bank IVR, a PBX, a payment platform) can mask a caller itself by sending a SIP request inside the call (INFO, re-INVITE or UPDATE) with this header. The sender's side is masked (tones and voice) until it sends off; add ;side=peer to mask the other party instead. The header never travels further, and an INFO that carries nothing else is answered by the phone system.
1INFO sip:agent@10.0.0.5 SIP/2.02...3X-PCI-Mask: on4Content-Length: 05 6(the customer types or reads the card number)7 8INFO sip:agent@10.0.0.5 SIP/2.09...10X-PCI-Mask: off11Content-Length: 0Recordings
Encrypted at rest
Asterisk writes each call's recording while it runs; within seconds of the call ending it is encrypted with AES-256-GCM and the plain file is deleted. Playback, downloads and transcription decrypt in memory only. The key lives in /etc/voip-vault/recording.keys, readable by the dashboard only, and is deliberately not in backups: keep an offline copy, because without it the recordings cannot be played.
Fingerprint and integrity check
When a recording is sealed, the SHA-256 of its audio is stored apart from the file. Verify all recordings now (Compliance) decrypts every recording of the organization and compares; an altered or missing file is reported and the check is written to the audit trail.
Key rotation
1sudo voip-vault-rekey --status # keys, and how many files each one holds2sudo voip-vault-rekey --add-key # a new key; new recordings use it3sudo voip-vault-rekey --dry-run # what re-encryption would do4sudo voip-vault-rekey # re-encrypt every file with the newest key5sudo voip-vault-rekey --retire k1 # remove a key once no file needs itRe-encryption keeps the audio, so each file's SHA-256 stays valid.
Spoken numbers silenced
After a call is transcribed, the stretches where a card number, CNIC, OTP, PIN or CVV was said are replaced by silence in the recording, using the transcript's word timings. The file is re-encrypted and gets a second SHA-256 next to the original; the audit trail notes it. Transcripts never contain those numbers (they are masked before anything is stored).
- It happens when a call is transcribed: switch on call analysis, or Transcribe every recorded call under Compliance (uses speech minutes).
- It is after the call, not live: the agent hears what the customer says. Take card data on the keypad.
- It is as good as the speech service's hearing of the numbers.
- It changes recordings for good. Switch it off under Compliance if your rules require the original audio.
Encryption on the network
| Connection | Signalling | Media |
|---|---|---|
| Browser phone | WSS (TLS) | DTLS-SRTP, always |
| Desk phone on SIP over TLS (5061) | TLS | SRTP, AES-256 first (SRTP_PHONES) |
| Desk phone on UDP / TCP | Plain | Plain RTP |
| Carrier on TLS | TLS | SRTP (SRTP_TRUNKS) |
| Carrier on UDP | Plain | Plain RTP |
| Dashboard and API | HTTPS | — |
config.env
TLS_MODEselfsigned | letsencrypt | custom- custom = your organization's own certificate:
TLS_CERT_FILE,TLS_KEY_FILE,TLS_CHAIN_FILE,TLS_CA_FILE. Check it first withsudo scripts/gen-tls.sh --check cert.pem key.pem [chain.pem]. TLS_MIN_VERSION1.2 | 1.3- Oldest TLS accepted for HTTPS, WSS and SIP over TLS. 1.3 may lock out old desk phones.
SRTP_PHONESoptional | required | off- optional: offered, phones without SRTP still work. required: plain-RTP calls from TLS phones are refused (488).
SRTP_TRUNKSoptional | required | off- The same for carriers on TLS (
TELNYX_TRANSPORT="tls", or an organization trunk set to TLS).
Audit trail
Sign-ins, setting changes, recording playbacks, downloads, transcript views, exports, captures and integrity checks are written to the audit trail with who, when and from where. Each entry carries a hash of the one before it, per organization, and the database refuses changes and deletions, so a changed, removed or inserted entry shows as a break under Compliance. Export any period as CSV (each row with its hash) for your auditors.
What your organization still has to do
- Require two-factor sign-in (Organization settings → Security).
- Keep an offline copy of the recording key, and a copy of the backups away from the server (
BACKUP_S3_URIorBACKUP_RSYNC_TARGETin/etc/voip-stack/backup.env). - Put the server in a separate network segment, keep it patched, and have it penetration-tested before going live.
- Train agents to take card data only through secure entry, and write the policies your auditors expect.